Thursday, December 8, 2011

Diary: Just One Thing

I'm taking a squint at John Mauldin's book "Just One Thing" on amazon. I'm looking through the freebie stuff, I don't know whether I'll buy it. There's so many books I'm interested in that I don't know which one to get next. On page 162, it notes:
I published a short study in which I looked back over the last eighty years and asked the question, "How often does the number-one ranked company in market capitalization outperform the average stock of the next one year, three years, five years, and ten years?" The simple answer seems to be that on average, over time, about 80 percent of the time, the largest-capitalization company underperforms over the next ten years ... by 40 to 50 percentage ponts over the next ten years.
This comment chimes well with what I read from Peter Lynch: that by the time a company makes it into the top tier, it's half-way puffed out. Should I get the book - what do you reckon?

The top market cap stock in the S&P500 is XOM (Exxon Mobil), for the Footise, it's HSBA (HSBC Holidings).

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Diary: Value investing - it's no panacea

Three buckets

There's a couple of interesting posts I want to touch upon. Valuhunteruk wrote:
To state it simply, it isn’t about just buying stocks with low P/Es or P/Bs. We have to keep an eye on risk and the fundamental quality of the business we are buying into.
My response was generally along the lines that it's a contradiction in terms.  Aswath Damodaran sums it up perfectly: the PE ratio is a combination of the risk-free rate, the expected growth rate, and the risk. In other words, TCG (Thomas Cook) isn't on a PER of just over 1 because the market somehow forgot the ticker symbol, it's on a PER of 1 because the economy is going into the tank, it's making losses, business is expected to decline, and it has being trying to prevent breaches in its banking covenants. So the question isn't so much "is it a business with a good fundamental quality", but "is it underpriced". The first question is easy to answer: no, it's a rubbish business with deluded rubbish managers. The second question is harder to answer. For all I know, the intrinsic value of TCG is zilch nada, making the share overpriced rather than underpriced.

Expecting Value also did a review of his value portfolio in December, and found underperformance. He sums up:
The fact I think the market is mispricing these companies is evident by me purchasing them; I wouldn't do it otherwise. Since it mispriced them then, there's no reason to think that me buying them will magically reconcile the price with the true value; that could take years.
 Value investor Richard Beddard also expressed his frustration recently. His T30 (Thrifty 30) invests in micro-caps. In the period from 09-Sep-2009 to 01-Dec-2011, his performance is a whisker ahead of the All-share. I hope Richard doesn't take it the wrong way when I say that, so far, his theory that micro-caps are under-researched and hence should produce a higher return hasn't been a convincing one so far. I'm also worried that he hasn't properly adjusted for the high spreads that are inherent in micros.

More bad news for value investors comes in the form of Stephen Bland (aka Pyad) over at The Motley Fool. I can't find the link, but at the latest update, he was underperforming the indices. I used to think that Stephen was an excellent investor, but he has decreased in my estimation considerably.

"OK Mr. Smartypants, how are you doing so far this year?", I hear you ask. My response is "Stay tuned". I'll write about it in another post.

I'm now tending more and more to think of the stock market as consisting of 3 buckets: a "value bucket", a "defensive bucket", and a "growth bucket" (my experiences with insurers and banks is particularly solidifying my view - but like I say, it's for another post). Out of mathematical necessity, one bucket has to underperform the averages, whilst another has to outperfrom. So far this year, we've certainly seem that the defensives have outperformed value, with growth being amongst the outperformers, too.

My view now is that in order to outperform, you either need to own the right bucket, or you need to pick the right companies within your chosen bucket. There are advantages and disadvantages with both approaches. "The right bucket" requires two things: that the bucket is wildly mispriced, and you can know it is mispriced. If you can settle that question, then you merely have to choose the contents of the bucket at more-or-less at random. It doesn't matter what you choose (within reason, of course), you just need to choose a selection of them. This is the easy approach. It requires little imagination, and the worst that will happen is that you'll underperform the market somewhat. If in doubt, just choose the value bucket, or possibly the defensive bucket. The other approach is to choose the right companies in whatever bucket is your preferred one. The problem here is that you'll need to be a genius-level Mike Burry insight with Aspergers to do that (don't leave out the Aspergers, that's your structural advantage!). Very, very, difficult, as the people I've mentioned above have discovered.

We've still got a question to answer: which bucket should I choose now? Well, it's tricky! Value has taken a pounding lately, so it's plausible to answer that they'll be a dash for trash, and you should choose the value bucket. I see that Barclays and Lloyds are up nearly 2% today (did you guys buy those banks?)  despite all the doom and gloom surrounding the financial situation in the Eurozone. Some of the really beaten-up stuff is making a strong recovery (Pace is up 30% over the last week or so, and it's up over 5% today).

But I don't think value is the right way to bet at the moment, despite this. I'm thinking of two factors here. For starters, take a look at AAPL (Apple). It is trading on a PER of 14. It has cash of £26bn against a market cap of £363bn, a forward PE of 10, massive returns on equity of 41%, and net income margins of 23%. That such a large, strong, profitable growing company is trading at these kinds of multiples suggests to me that growth is very cheap, and that we should buy growth. There actually seems to be some gross mispricings in the US markets, more obvious even than in the UK markets. MSFT (Microsoft) is on a PER of 9, yet it too has massive returns on equity, and even better margins than AAPL. I'm not saying that MSFT is a better growth company; but I seriously doubt investors will do badly buying into these kinds of companies. BRK (Berkshire Hathaway) is on a PBV of about 1, the lowest its been in way over a decade.

The second factor (all of the above was just the first factor, believe it or not), is simply an elaboration of the point above. In a previous post, I concluded that the relative PBVs of value and growth shares put the odds in favour of growth - with the caveat that I might have misinterpreted Grantham's method of measuring the values. In another post, I also said that the combination of VIX and the CBOE Put/Call ratio indicated that growth would be the more successful strategy - again subject to the caveat that I had misinterpreted information.

I'm also mindful of the fact that if economic conditions deteriorate, as is looking increasingly likely, then value is going to be the worst place to be. It's not all a one-way bet, of course, because the problems are well-understood, and if the Euro manages to magic away the problem "until next time", it's likely that all the junk will rise to the top.

Good luck one and all. I hope no-one has taken offense. If it's any consolation, it's been no picnic for me either. Happy investing, and let's hope Santa brings us a nice rally.

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Diary

Been reading a scribd document of Michael Burry write-ups, courtesy of csinvesting (top quality blog). Not only am I not in the same ballpark as Burry - I'm not even on the same planet. I think it will be very difficult for most people to emulate him. Burry seems quite a short-term investor, spotting anomolies that he thinks the market will correct.The companies he selects don't seem to be great businesses - maybe Burry is "an early Buffett on steroids", although I am anaware as to how penetrating Buffett's early analysis is. His first recommendation, for instance is GTSI, which is down 32% over the last decade. It peaked at around $15 at the end of 2002. Burry wrote about it in March 2001 at $5. So clearly, a masterly shorter-term play, but not a long-term buy and hold. Contrariwise, the document doesn't give Burry's assessment of Apple, but if memory serves, he made about 30% on it - and we now all know just how well Apple went on to perform.

An interesting comment by him:
spin-offs  often  reach  a  price  nadir about one-year after the spin-off date

All hail to the Burry.

Monday, December 5, 2011

Job vacancies in Oil & Gas in Aberdeen

My employer, Smith Rea Energy Limited, is looking to recruit in the Aberdeen/Bridge of Don area in oil and gas. All levels of experience considered. Email me at mcturra2000@yahoo.co.uk in the first instance if you're interested.

Diary

Myopia

Are markets/analysts too myopic, or just see the wrong things? Here's a couple of examples that readily spring to mind.

PIC is up 15% today - up 30% since the beginning of the month (!) - from very very low levels I might add - on news that its hard disk supplier, Western Digital, is restarting its operations after flooding of its factories halted production earlier this year. The point is, when you think about it, did the market really believe that production capacity for hard drives had really been wiped out permanently? Even if WD did go bankrupt as a result (it hasn't happened in the case, but catastrophes at factories can be a source of bankruptcies), it seems likely that some other manufacturer would be able to increase production, or bring new facilities online eventually.


Sunday, December 4, 2011

Diary: mai

MAI - Maintel - Support Services - 252.6p/£27m

I'm pretty sure I got this suggestion from S Baines at Cautious Bull, who unfortunately doesn't blog anymore. So here's a bit of a rundown.

Some stats: PER 9.5. ROE 78.5%, gearing £-120m, net cash £3.3m, z-score 5.58, yield 4.1%. EPS projections: 2011F 26.6p + 31%, 2012F 34.8p + 31%

Spread is 6.1%. AIM index.

What it does:
Maintel Holdings Plc is engaged in the provision of contracted maintenance services, the sale and installation of telecommunications systems and the provision of fixed line, mobile and data telecommunications services, predominantly to the enterprise business sector. The Company operates in two segments: telephone maintenance and equipment sales, and telephone network services. The maintenance and equipment division provides maintenance, service and support of office-based voice and data equipment across the United Kingdom on a contracted basis. It also supplies and installs voice and data equipment to maintenance customers. The network services division sells a portfolio of services, which includes telephone line rental, inbound and outbound telephone calls, data connectivity, Internet access and Internet protocol telephony solutions. Its subsidiaries include Maintel Europe Limited and Maintel Voice and Data Limited.
 Director holdings: Booth £7.0m, McCaffery £5.5m, others neglible.

Latest interim results for 6 m/e 30-Jun-2011 issued 12-Sep-2011:
 Underlying revenues up 10%. Dividends up 18%. While market conditions remain challenging Maintel continues to grow, with the equipment pipeline healthy and the maintenance and network services sales pipelines remaining strong in the medium term. With the market consolidating at a renewed pace, we continue to actively seek acquisition opportunities to enhance our service offering.

Fundoo Professor blog

Worth a read despite the goofy title. Seriously, forget what the blog is named, just soak up the quality of his writing. He doesn't post often.

An interesting point was raised in his post "Vantage Point":
”How is much its worth,” is tougher than the question, “Is this likely to be worth a lot more than my price?”
 This harks back to my observation that whenever I've seen Ackman being pressed for a value for a business, he never gives an answer X. This point was covered in a post by Geoff Gannon:
You don't need to use a lot of math to prove exactly what something is worth. You just need to present a convincing case for buying it.
 Tweets

 I jotted some tweets a week or so back of what some good private investors think. It'll be interesting to review this 6 months down the line.

27-Nov-2011 MrContrarian Mr Contrarian
French Connection (FCCN) article on Expecting Value "Even strong bal sheet doesn't give much of a margin of safety" I hold

 28-Nov-2011 MrContrarian Mr Contrarian
Thomas Cook Gp (£TCG) +8.4 on conf of re-fin to Apr 2013, relaxed covenants. Will seek 'more appropriate capital structure'. I have shorted.

28-Nov-2011 paulypilot Paul Scott
Back into QED at 34p. Seems a good price, deep discount to NAV. Quality lettings at London Outlet centre.

Saturday, December 3, 2011

Diary

Moving Averages bad for Magic Formula

An interesting article appeared on Turnkey Analyst on 27-Nov-2011. It has noted that MA (Moving Averages) rules have worked historically. Applying MA to a simple quantitative value actually destroys performance, including Magic Formula.

Bizarre, because it seems to overturn a lot of what I've been hearing about combining value with momentum.

Strategic logic

The ever-excellent csi (csinvesting) blog has run two articles on strategic logic, using Kodak as an example.

Part 1

Don't follow market mavens off a cliff [a point that Jim Chanos made at the recent Value Investing Conference, too].

csi says that Bill Miller probably got caught up in the turnaround story, the CEO, etc., but they didn't ask a simple question: "what competitive advantage would Kodak have in its new endeavour?"

There are only 3 types of competitive advantages:
  1. Supply - it's a low-cost operator - maybe coming from privileged access to crucial inputs, but more commonly through proprietary tech. that is protected by patents
  2. Demand - usually the result of network effects or customer captivity. csi dismisses the idea of product differentiation or branding [a view shared by Greenwald], because all competitors are able to differentiate their brands.
  3. Economies of scale
Morningstar categorizes economic moats in 5 ways:
  1. efficient scale - the market is limited, so there is no incentive for competitors (e.g. WD-40)
  2. network effect - large networks are more attractive to users, making it difficult for upstarts to penetrate
  3. cost advantage - usually in a commodity industry
  4. intangible assets - patents, tradcemarks, copyrights, government approvals, brand names
  5. switching costs
Part 2

The death of traditional photography was recognised as far back as 2003. Faced with such a problem, Kodak seems to have a straightforward strategic solution: enter in digital photography. But that wont work. Digital photography is not as commercially attractive as chemical photography, and Kodak has no competitive advantage in digital photography.